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Abstract—Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are evolving with
advances in new technology. The addition of wireless sensors and
actuators and new control techniques means that engineering
practices from communication systems are being integrated into
those used for control systems. The two are engineered in
very different ways. Neither engineering approach is capable
of accounting for the subtle interactions and interdependence
that occur when the two are combined. This paper describes our
first steps to bridge this gap, and push the boundaries of both
computer communication system and control system design. We
present The Separator testbed, a Cyber-Physical testbed enabling
our search for a suitable way to engineer systems that combine
both computer networks and control systems.
Index Terms—Cyber-Physical Systems, Industrial Control Sys-
tems, Wireless Communication Networks, Testbed
I. INTRODUCTION
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are used in civil infras-
tructure (water and gas distribution networks, power grids,
transportation) and industrial applications (process plants,
automotive industry). The automation of these systems is
constantly evolving with new technologies to increase their
efficiency, safety and reduce human management effort. One
area currently changing ICS is the integration of wireless
communication systems. The inclusion of new technologies
creates new interactions between system components that
previously did not exist. This paper presents a new ICS testbed
that enables us to explore these new interactions.
WirelessHART and ISA 100.11a [11] are wireless com-
munication protocols used for ICS applications. They were
designed for traditional sensing applications, standardised to
be used in industry and are used without any consideration for
the influences that the control application has on them, and the
affects that they have on the control application. For instance,
if network interference slows down the data rate of the sensors
to the controller, the controller may not have the up-to-date
information that it needs to maintain system stability. On the
other hand, if the controller is using a sampling scheme that
can vary based on system state, then a disturbance to the
system may cause the sensors to send data at a rate higher
than the network channel capacity.
This notion of coupling between the control system, com-
munication system and computation is the core idea of Cyber-
Physical Systems (CPS). The aim of CPS is to develop
approaches to engineer these coupled system components in a
way that ensures the entire system meets its design goals of
stability and safety.
A common approach to study the interactions between
system components such as communication and control is
through mathematical models and simulations. Control sys-
tems are modelled analytically using differential equations,
computer systems are modelled using simulations and dis-
crete mathematical representations and these models do not
combine easily [5]. There exist simulation environments such
as Ptolemy II [12], but they use a high level of abstraction
and need a special notion of time to integrate the continuous
and discrete domains. The high level of abstraction obscures
realistic effects like radio interference, temperature effects on
the physical phenomenon, etc. These effects are difficult to
categorise and hard to include in simulation, yet they may
have a large impact when these systems are deployed in the
wild.
In this paper we present a CPS simulation testbed called
The Separator. It overcomes the loss of accuracy due to
abstraction associated with the use of simulations and models.
The Separator allows us to reliably emulate the behaviour of a
real system and accurately provide the physical characteristics
of sensors and actuators as well as the unpredictability of
wireless communication systems. It also gives us the ability
to perform repeatable experiments so that we can categorise
and understand the nature of CPS interactions present in the
system.
We collaborated with ABB to address the questions of the
design, engineering and safety of a testbed suitable to explore
the CPS interactions in ICS. They are keenly aware of the
challenges, risks and issues associated with ICS engineering.
Together, we developed the following testbed requirements.
1) Have a real physical process that lends itself to control
and has a well defined notion of stability and safety.
2) Use industrial grade sensors and actuators for sensing
and actuation of the physical process to approximate the
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behaviour on a real ICS. Domestic components can not
handle the demands of industrial applications, such as
pressure for valves, current for wiring or to be operated
constantly for long periods of time.
3) Control the process with an industrial grade controller
that has the same performance as one that would be used
on a production system.
4) Use state-of-art wireless network connecting the sensors
to the controller to allow us to observe the performance
of the system with different radio environments.
5) Build a system that can be used to address the issues
of communication and control co-design and capture
the subtle interactions between sensing, communication,
control and computation.
6) Design a safe system that can be used by students and
researchers in an academic environment.
ABB addressed all of the diverse engineering challenges that
are associated with the development of a CPS testbed with a
real physical process. Together we developed The Separator,
a two phase, oil and water gravity separator with senors
communicating using WirelessHART that uses industrial grade
components.
In this paper we review previous approaches to the en-
gineering of ICS systems, present the specifications of The
Separator, show examples of the type of research that it is
capable of,briefly describe what we have learned so far from
its specification and building, and conclude with a description
of the research that we intend to pursue in the future.
II. RELATED WORK
CPS interactions can be studied with two methods. One is to
use models and simulation tools and second by using tesbteds.
We first discuss some of the CPS simulators and then describe
some CPS testbeds. For a more in-depth discussion please refer
to [14].
There are model based approaches that use computer sys-
tems to create models of CPSs. Systems such as Ptolemy II
[12] or GISOO [2] combine discrete state-based models of
computer systems with continuous models of physical systems
and their controllers. Modelling platforms do not use input
data from real sensors and actuators that contain noise from
the physical sensing process and radio environment. This kind
of noise is difficult to correctly categorise and include in
simulation, yet can have a profound impact on the system
when it is deployed in the wild.
There are a number of CPS testbeds simulating smart grids
and water distribution networks. The Secure Water Treatment
(SWaT) testbed [8] was designed to assess the security vul-
nerabilities of water treatment plants. The Water Distrubition
Tesbted (WADI) [1] is used for detecting cyber-attacks and
physical attacks. The INVITED [13] testbed is designed to
test the timing behaviours of CPSs. In [9], the authors have
created a SCADA testbed with a focus on security research.
This testbed uses industrial grade sensors and controller but
does not use industrial wireless protocols. In [3], the authors
use various aperiodic control schemes with 802.15.4 to control
a double-tank system. The above testbeds have been designed
for security research or timing analysis but none of them
were designed to study CPS interactions nor do they use
state-of-the-art communication protocols designed for control
like WirelessHART. Other testbeds [6] focus on systems with
pendulums as the physical process. Although Pendulums are
an accepted benchmark for the control theory community
[4], our industrial partners suggested two-phase oil and water
separation as a physical process that is more representative in
the process industry.
The CPS testbed that is closest to our requirements is the
WaterBox [7]. It was designed with domestic components, a
controllable process and used 802.11 wireless communication
at the time of publication. The small-scale domestic control-
lable valves on the WaterBox can only handle a small total
line pressure, and adjust themselves from open to close in 1
second. We wanted industrial grade controllable valves and
sensors. The one used in our testbed is designed for higher
line pressures, but requires 9 seconds to adjust themselves
from fully open to fully closed. These minor differences are
very important to the fidelity of our testbed.
In the next section we describe the physical and digital
architecture of The Separator.
III. THE SEPARATOR ARCHITECTURE
The Separator testbed is the result of the design require-
ments given in Section I. A summary of the Separator physical
process is given next, followed by a more in-depth description
of the Separator’s design overview and the components and the
way that each of our requirements has been met. Finally, we
present the safety features of The Separator.
A. The Separator Physical Process
Control of liquid levels in tanks and flows between tanks are
basic problems in process industry [10]. And so, the physical
process that we use is oil and water gravity separation. It is
used in the petroleum industry. When the petroleum mixture
is extracted, the oil is mixed with water and other impurities.
This mixture is put into a tank where the water settles to the
bottom, and the oil floats on top at the rate of separation. The
placement of a simple barrier in the middle of the tank allows
one part of the tank to have only water at the bottom, and the
other to have only oil. The water and oil can then be separated
and drained into individual tanks by putting automatic valves
at the bottom of the tank. The level of oil and water in the
separation tank can be kept constant by controlling the degree
to which the valves are open.
The oil separation process lends itself to a clear definition
of stability. The oil and the water levels, in their respective
sections of the separation tank, are set by an operator. The
controller maintains the oil and water levels by setting the
opening degree of the valves. The degree over or under the
set point of the liquid levels is referred to as the overshoot, or
undershoot. We can use the maximum size of the overshoot
above the set point as the measure of system stability.
Fig. 1: The Separator Design Overview
The notion of safety is defined in terms of the stability. If
the total liquid level in the tank with its overshoot are below
a certain level, we can say that the system is operating safely.
If the total liquid level with its overshoot exceeds 80% of
the total capacity of the tank, or if the water level exceeds
its section and enters the oil section, we say that the system
is operating in an unsafe way. This clean distinction between
safe and unsafe states is common to all ICS applications, and
gives us a clear set of parameters to use for analysis.
These notions will be made clear in the next section when
we present the actual architecture of The Separator.
B. The Separator Design Overview
The design overview of The Separator is depicted in Fig-
ure 1. The Separator consists of two individual layers:
Lower layer - A feed tank holding 100 litres of ionised water
and 105 liters of Exxsol D-60 oil. The tank has two feed
valves (V1 and V2), one for the water and one for the oil. An
electrical impeller pump mixes and pumps the oil and water
to the upper layer.
Upper layer - A 60 litre separation tank in which the
separation process occurs. The tank is fitted with wireless
sensors (P1, P2, P3 and T) and wired actuators (LV1 and
LV2). The oil and water mixture is pumped into the separation
tank by the pump mentioned above via inlet valve (V3). The
separation tank is divided into two sections by a separation
plate. The left section holds water and oil and is where gravity
separation occurs. The right section receives the overflow from
the left section, and contains only oil. There are valves at the
bottom of the separation tank, one in the left section which
only drains water (LV1), and one in the right section for oil
(LV2). The water and oil levels are regulated by the PID
controller which operates the valves.
C. The Separator Components
The real Separator architecture is depicted in Figure 2. Indi-
vidual components of the Separator testbed are: sensor nodes,
actuator nodes, controller, wireless network and additional
supporting components. These are described next.
Sensor Nodes - The Separator has four industrial grade
Fig. 2: The Separator Testbed and its Components: a) Front
view, b) Operator Workplace, c) WirelessHART gateway, d)
Sensor node, e) Electrical cupboard with controller, f) Actuator
node
wireless sensors (depicted in Figure 2d) to measure the states
of physical process. These are:
• Two ABB DP-Style 266DSH differential pressure sensors
(P2 and P3 in Figure 1) that are used to measure oil
and water levels. The sensor P2 measures the water
level in the left compartment of the tank based on the
pressure difference between two liquids (oil and water)
where water is at the bottom of the tank and oil on the
top. The sensor P3 measures the oil level in the right
compartment of the tank based on the pressure difference
at the lowest (oil) and highest point (open-air) of the tank.
The differential pressure values measured by P2 and P3
are used as inputs for the PID controller.
• An ABB 266HSH High overload Pressure sensor (P1 in
Figure 1) that measures the absolute pressure in the feed
line pipe. It is used as an input to the alarm system and
the controller stops the system if the pressure in the pipe
exceeds a threshold.
• An ABB TTF300-W WirelessHART Temperature sensor
(T in Figure 1) that measures the temperature of the oil
in the tank. It is used as an input for the alarm system.
The system stops its operation when the temperature of
oil exceeds a threshold.
The differential pressure sensors require calibration before
each run and it remains stable once operation has begun.
Actuator Nodes - There are five Belimo NRQ24A-SR indus-
trial grade valves in the system (depicted in Figure 2f). These
valves can go from fully open (100%) to fully closed (0%) in
9 seconds. Two of these valves control the water and oil inputs
to the system (V1 and V2 in Figure 1). The third valve controls
the inlet level of the mixture into the tank (V3 in Figure 1).
The other two valves are controlled by the PID controller to
ensure that the oil and water levels are at the set-points (LV1
and LV2 in Figure 1).
Industrial Grade Controller - The controller in Figure 2e
is an ABB AC800M programmable automation with a CI867
Modbus TCP interface card The CI867 enables a Modbus TCP
connection over Ethernet between the AC800M controller,
the AWIN GW100 WirelessHART gateway and the ACS355
motor drive. In the Separator we tune two basic PID controllers
to control the water and oil levels in the left and right
compartments. The system tunes the levels of the oil first and
then the levels of the water. The constant PID values are as
follows: for water P = 1.4, I = 80 and for oil P = 2, I = 40
and D = 0 in both cases.
Wireless Network - The wireless sensors communicate
over WirelessHART protocol, an International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) approved wireless communication protocol
for wireless sensor networks. It is based on the Highway
Addressable Remote Transducer (HART) protocol and uses
802.15.4 in the 2.4GHz ISM band. It forms a resilient self-
organising network. Sensors nodes can find neighbours, detect
failures, form communication routes and adjust these routes
based on sensor node failure. They form a mesh topology
network where each node can act as a router for its neigh-
bours. Each node connects directly with a minimum of two
neighbours in order to provide this resiliency.
WirelessHART organises the sensors so that they can trans-
mit their readings to a central gateway, which forwards its data
over Ethernet to the controller. The WirelessHART gateway in
the Separator is the AWIN GW100 (depicted in Figure 2c).
The gateway communicates using TCP via the CI867 Modbus
TCP interface to the AC800M controller.
Supporting Components - There is an electrical cabinet on
the rear of the Separator that houses the ACS355 Drive, the
24V DC power supply, the network switch and the Intel NUC
PC (depicted in Figure 2e). It includes the distribution of the
220V AC and 24V DC to the above equipment through four
circuit breakers and a marshalling terminal for the IO signals.
The Separator has a Human Machine Interface (HMI) as
a part of the Operator Workplace (depicted in Figure 2b).
It allows the user to see information regarding the physical
process, shows the state of the actuators and the measured
values from the sensors. The user can intervene to stop the
pump if deemed necessary, or to open/close a valve and even
set the set-points at runtime.
D. Safe Operation for Users of the System
The last of our design requirements was that our CPS
testbed be safe to use for research by students and researchers.
To address this, The Separator was designed in compliance
with ABB’s process safety expertise. The Separator controller
shuts down the system in the event that the water or oil
level reach 80%, to prevent an unsafe state. There is also an
emergency switch under the separator tank which shuts the
pump down when it is pressed.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL USE CASES OF THE SEPARATOR
In this section we present potential experimental use cases
of The Separator. These include both the aspects of process
control and system communication. We first present results
showing the stability of the control process under stable
operation. We then show how The Separator can adjust itself
and maintain system stability when the oil level set point
changes. Finally, we show the robustness of the network
and the controller to local radio interference which causes
slower communication. We evaluate CPS performance with
four metrics that are defined as follows:
• Latency (in ms) - The average time required for a
data packet to travel from the originating sensor to the
controller.
• Path stability (in %) - The ratio of acknowledged packets
to sent packets between two sensors or between a sensor
and the gateway.
• Overshoots (OvSh in %) - The percentage of the liquid
(water or oil) above the set-point. This metric is important
for ensuring safe behaviour of the system.
• Undershoots (UnSh in %) - The percentage of the liquid
below the set-point after the first overshoot. This metric
indicates the minimum level of liquid in the tank once
the set-point has been reached.
The first two metrics describe the performance of the com-
munication network, while the last two metrics describe the
performance of the control system.
A. Use Case 1: Stable Process Operation
We first evaluate the stable operation of the testbed. We tune
the PID controller and the inlet valves to create a baseline
experiment (as defined in Section ??). In this experiment,
the goal of the system is to maintain the levels of oil and
water at the desired set-points of 60% and 40%, respectively.
We run the experiment five times. The results for overshoots
and undershoots in the left compartment (i.e. the water level)
over four waves are shown in Table I. The results for latency
and path stability are shown in Table II. We also present
the measured oil and water levels and actuator levels for
the left and right compartments in Figure 3. The results
in Table I show that the water level overshoots are almost
indistinguishable for the second, third and four peaks. These
peaks occur during stable operation. The first wave occurs
as the system is stabilising, and so has larger overshoots,
but has small standard deviation between experiments. These
experiments show that The Separator can be used to perform
Fig. 3: Stable process operation: a) Oil and water levels, b)
Actuators open levels
TABLE I: Stable process operation: Overshoots and Under-
shoots for water levels over 5 runs
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4
OvSh (%) 25.1704 10.2661 10.0240 10.5441
OvSh Std Dev(%) 4.7141 1.3195 1.2979 0.8178
UnSh (%) 13.7424 12.1086 9.6345 8.8093
UnSh Std Dev(%) 1.2343 0.7708 0.7244 1.0362
TABLE II: Stable process operation: Latency and Path stability
over 5 runs
Run 1 Run 2 Run 3 Run 4 Run 5
Latency (ms) 0.35425 0.35925 0.35525 0.351 0.3515
Path Stability (%) 99.5345 99.45125 99.5463 99.5075 99.3543
reproducible experiments, with a very small standard deviation
between the mean values during system stability.
B. Use Case 2: Stable Operation with changing Oil Set-Point
at Run-Time
Use case 2 evaluates the capability of The Separator to
maintain a stable system when the set-point changes. This
allows us to evaluate the performance of the network and the
controller for an application with requirements that change at
run-time. We change the set-point for oil level from 60% to
40% after three overshoot peaks. We run the experiment five
times and present the average overshoots, undershoots and
the standard deviation after the set-point has been changed.
The results are presented in Table III. We also present the
oil level and open-level of the actuators in Figure 4. The first
undershoot occurs as the system is stabilising itself, but it
is still small, and the average of the results has a standard
deviation which is less than 1.2%. The system stabilises after
the change very quickly, and by the subsequent overshoots
are very small, and self-similar between runs with a standard
deviation of less than 1%. These results show that The
Separator can perform reproducible experiments with run-time
configuration changes.
Fig. 4: Oil levels and Actuator open levels for the set-point
change
TABLE III: Oil Errors, first one is undershoot other two
overshoots for the set-point change from 60% to 40%
UnSh 1 OvSh 1 OvSh 2
Error (%) 14.5458 7.7229 6.1727
Error Std Dev(%) 1.1636 0.7453 0.5893
TABLE IV: Disruption of WirelessHART protocol
Reliability (%) Stability (%) Latency (ms)
t = 0 min 100 99.38 0.296
t = 7 min 100 88.26 0.452
t = 20 min 100 71.9 0.402
C. Use Case 3: Stable Operation in the Presence of Radio
Interference
The Separator contains sensors that communicate to a
gateway via WirelessHART. This allows us to evaluate the
robustness of the network and controller to adverse wireless
communication conditions cause by interference (potentially
an attacker). To realise this, we used two USRP B210 software
defined radios to create white noise interference in the range
of 802.15.4 channels 14, 15, 16, 23, 24, and 25. The affects
are shown in Table IV. We can see that the reliability, or
percentage of messages received, was 100% for the entire
trial. The link stability, or the number acknowledgements over
the number of messages, dropped due to the interference,
and the packet delivery latency increased. The reliability of
WirelessHART is unsurprising, it is a robust, multi-channel
protocol that blacklists unreliable channels. Despite the robust-
ness of WirelessHART, we can see that the link stability and
network performance were still affected by the interference.
These results show that The Separator can also be used
to evaluate system robustness in the presence of adverse
communication conditions.
V. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Part of the research output of The Separator was the
investigating what is needed for the research, design, and
engineering of reliable, safe CPSs. We tread the line between
fidelity, with the use of industrial grade sensors, flexibility,
with less robust research equipment. Things that we would
consider differently would be:
1) Industrial grade wireless transceivers can not run differ-
ent communication protocols or add more sensors. For
future iterations we would search for a flexible industrial
level sensor platform.
2) The current differential pressure sensors require calibra-
tion after every run/every time the tank is drained. In an
industrial setting, this calibration is not time-consuming.
The processes run for a long time. In research, multiple
experiments are run. Sensors that need calibration every
run add an overhead, and make it difficult to obtain
repeatable results. We would search for industrial grade
sensors less reliant on initial calibration.
Finally, if we had unlimited funds we would choose to build
a larger-scale distributed system as many industrial systems
are distributed over a number of processes and over large
distances. This would also allow for the deployment and
evaluation of long-range communication protocols like LoRa.
A list of the future research opportunities with the current
generation of The Separator, along with other associated
directions, is presented below:
Co-design of Communication and Control Techniques -
Explore different techniques to co-design systems that inte-
grate communication and control. Examine the use of formal
techniques to model the protocol behaviour with the controller
to both ensure that the communication protocol maintains
the properties required by the controller, and use run-time
verification to check these properties during system operation.
Alternative Controller Schemes - Compare of various mod-
ern control schemes, such as event-triggered or self-triggered,
with currently used control schemes, such as time triggered
control. Experiment with other, non-conventional control ap-
proaches, such as the use of machine learning to learn ’black
box controllers’.
Alternative Communication Schemes - Use wired commu-
nication protocols like HART, Profibus, Fieldbus to commu-
nicate with the sensors. Integrate different communication
technologies like WiFi, 802.15.4e and bluetooth low energy
into The Separator.
CPS Security Research - Assess potential vulnerabilities that
the sensors and the communication may have to physical
layer attacks that aim to disrupt the sensor readings or the
communication to the controller.
Teaching and Collaborations - Use The Separator for teach-
ing. It is the perfect testbed illustrate several of the principles
of CPSs, gives students hands-on experience with a real
control system. The Separator will be available for collab-
orative projects that allow the broader ICS community (both
academia and industry) to contribute to our long-term goal of
transforming the ICS design process.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented The Separator, a CPS testbed
whose inception and creation are part of the search for ap-
proaches and techniques for the engineering of safe and stable
CPS systems. The Separator is a result of the need to better
understand the confluence of computer software and hardware
systems, wireless communication and physical control pro-
cesses. Preliminary experimental results demonstrate its high
reliability, its use in performing reproducible experiments, and
its ability to aid our understanding of how unreliable wireless
communication and physical controllers can affect one another,
and how to engineer this relationship to create stable and safe
CPS.
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